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1.  Introduction 
The threat of terrorist attacks has intensified in recent years. According to the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) constructed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Response to Terrorism (START), more than 2,600 terrorist attacks were conducted in the 
United States (U.S.) between 1970 and 2014 (Miller, 2016). The growing threat of terrorism has 
alarmed executives. The 19th Annual Global CEO Survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
emphasizes that “geopolitical uncertainty (exacerbated by regional conflicts and increased 
terrorism attacks) is a top concern for nearly three quarters of CEOs” (PwC, 2016, p.2).  
While there is a burgeoning literature on the impact of terrorist attacks on the economy and 
the stock market1, there is little micro-level evidence on specifically how firms and executives 
react to terrorist attacks. In this paper, we investigate whether chief executive officers (CEOs) 
renegotiate the level or structure of their compensation as a specific response to terrorist attacks. 
This is an important topic. Though CEO compensation has been extensively investigated over 
the past three decades, there are only a relative handful of papers that investigate how non-
monetary factors affect executive compensation and the evidence in these papers is mixed (Rau, 
2015). Deng and Gao (2013) find that companies located in locations with a low quality of life 
(based on factors such as crime rates or cost of living) pay higher compensation to their CEOs than 
firms located in more livable locations. Focke, Maug, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2017) show that CEOs 
of prestigious firms (based on Fortune’s list of Most Admired Companies, MAC) earn less, and 
suggest the CEOs are willing to trade off monetary compensation in return for additional status 
and career benefits from working for a publicly admired corporation. However, using exactly the 
                                                 
1 For example, terrorist attacks have been shown to adversely affect macroeconomic conditions and the performance of financial 
markets, with impacts on economic growth, foreign direct investment, property prices, consumer and investor confidence, the cost 
of capital, and stock prices. 
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same database, Cheng, Liu, McConnell, and Rosenblum (2017) show that CEOs of firms that 
increase their rankings on the MAC list, earn increases in compensation. Similarly, Francis, Hasan, 
John, and Waisman (2016) find that CEOs in metropolitan areas (which have a wealth of 
consumption amenities and employment opportunities and are generally more livable) are paid 
more than CEOs in rural areas. While these studies all attempt to solve the causality and 
endogeneity issues in varying ways, at the end, non-monetary factors such as prestige, livability, 
etc., are sufficiently difficult to define econometrically2, that it is problematic to cleanly attribute 
causality to the relation between non-monetary factors and compensation.  
In contrast, in our paper, we examine the causal effect of a specific non-monetary factor, a 
terrorist attack, on compensation. A terrorist attack is a clean, sharp, and specific event that forms 
an unexpected unambiguous deterioration in the quality of the CEO’s living environment. Hence 
if CEOs do indeed react to non-monetary factors in total compensation, we should see an increase 
in their pay following terrorist attacks. 
There are two plausible reasons to believe that CEOs might seek an increase in their level of 
compensation following terrorist attacks, one rational and one behavioral. The rational explanation 
is based on the literature that depicts top managers as risk averse. Harris and Raviv (1979) argue 
that executives prefer to structure their compensation to allow them to bear minimal personal risks. 
Peters and Wagner (2014) show that the probability of a CEO being fired is higher when the firm 
is experiencing volatile industry conditions. In turn, compensation is higher when turnover risk 
increases. Terrorism risk forms an example of a low-probability event with extreme negative 
consequences, a situation dramatically different from industry volatility. However, by posing 
                                                 
2 For example, Yonker (2016) shows that CEOs have strong local geographic preferences. Compensation is lower for local CEOs 
who earn utility from living locally. While Yonker’s results are consistent with those of Deng and Gao (2013), the mechanism is 
very different across the two papers. 
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severe personal safety threats to managers, terrorist attacks also increase the risks and uncertainty 
that executives face. The behavioral explanation is based on the literature that has shown that 
negative events, such as terrorist attacks, adversely affect emotions. Metcalfe, Powdthavee, and 
Dolan (2011) show that the September 11, 2001 attack in the U.S. resulted in reduced levels of 
subjective well-being. Ahern (2012) demonstrates that terrorist attacks have psychological impacts 
on trust and perceptions of well-being. Antoniou, Kumar, and Maligkris (2016a) show that analysts 
located near locations that have experienced terrorist attacks are more likely to issue pessimistic 
forecasts than those located far from such locations. Faced with increased psychological stress, 
CEOs may demand larger compensation packages in order to compensate them for their perceived 
loss of well-being.  
There are also plausible reasons to believe that terrorist attacks will affect the structure of 
compensation. As noted above, prior studies have shown that terrorist attacks can adversely affect 
macroeconomic conditions and the performance of financial markets.3 The consequent potential 
reduction in stock returns and the associated values of stock options may lead executives to reduce 
their preference for long-term incentive contracts (involving stock grants or stock options), instead 
displaying a preference for cash awards. In addition, if the adverse effects on firms increase the 
likelihood of financial distress (Guan, Li and Xu, 2016), the increased uncertainty caused by 
terrorist attacks may cause executives to adopt conservative corporate policies to avoid the risk of 
potential shocks (Antoniou, Kumar and Maligkris, 2016b). Finally, this uncertainty with respect 
to future firm performance may also impact the value of a manager’s human capital, which is 
correlated with the firm’s stock performance when a large part of executive compensation is 
                                                 
3 Examples include Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003; 2008), Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004), Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, 
and Younas (2014), Chesney, Reshetar, and Karaman (2011), Karolyi and Martell (2010), Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2006), 
Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Procasky and Ujah (2016), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Gould and Stecklov (2009), Arin, 
Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008), Brounen and Derwall (2010), Chen and Siems (2004), Kollias, Papadamou, and Stagiannis (2011), 
or Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2010). 
- 4 - 
 
granted in the form of stock. For all these reasons, subsequent to the attack, affected CEOs may 
prefer to be granted a larger share of their compensation in the form of cash payments than stock 
or option payments.  
In this study, we examine a sample of terrorist attacks that occurred in the U.S. from 1992 to 
2013, distinguishing firms that are located near terrorist attacks from those that are not. We identify 
whether a firm is affected by a terrorist attack by calculating the distance between the headquarters 
of the firm and the terrorist attack location (a measure of attack proximity). In our main tests, we 
use a difference-in-difference specification where our attack proximity indicator variable is time-
varying – it takes the value one for firms that are proximate to an attack only in the period after 
the attack. It takes the value zero for the treatment firms before the attack and for all the remaining 
firms. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between terrorist 
attacks and CEO pay. On average, CEOs working at firms in areas that are subject to a terrorist 
attack earn a terrorist pay premium of 12% following the attack. This result holds after controlling 
for time and firm fixed effects. The structure of compensation also changes. CEOs of companies 
located near terrorist attacks subsequently receive higher levels of cash compensation (salary and 
bonus) than CEOs of firms located in safer locations. Effectively, the entire post-attack increase 
in CEO compensation is the result of increases in cash compensation, while the increase in equity-
based (including option) compensation is insignificant.  
There are no changes in the financial or operational policies of the firm, suggesting that the 
adoption of conservative financial policies and their subsequent impact on option values is not 
likely to explain why CEOs prefer increases in cash compensation to option compensation. 
However, firms affected by terrorist attacks earn poorer returns than their matched peers in the 
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year after the attack, suggesting that the reduction in equity-based compensation value may 
partially account for a rational preference for cash-based compensation increases. 
Our results are robust to examining individual annual effects in the years both before and 
after the attack in the spirit of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and to using a propensity score 
matching (PSM) method to match firms located near terrorist attack scenes with firms with similar 
characteristics located farther away from such scenes within the same state. 
It is not obvious however, that all CEOs will obtain equally high pay levels in response to 
negative shocks to non-monetary factors. While it is plausible to expect CEOs to demand higher 
pay levels, the probability that firms will supply higher compensation levels depends on the 
bargaining power of the CEO. We further find that the terrorist-proximity premium is larger for 
more powerful CEOs, where CEO power is defined using standard measures of corporate 
governance. We find no such premium for other executives and rank-and-file employees. 
Our study contributes to two streams of literature. First, it contributes to the executive 
compensation literature. There is very limited research on non-monetary factors that influence 
executive compensation. Our findings enhance our understanding of how specific non-monetary 
factors affect CEO compensation. Our paper also contributes to the literature on how risk affects 
CEO compensation. Terrorism risk forms an example of a low-probability event with extreme 
negative consequences, a situation dramatically different from industry volatility studied in prior 
papers, and we show that it has similar effects on compensation. Second, our study contributes to 
the extensive literature that analyzes the implications of terrorism. Early prior studies focus on the 
macroeconomic effects of terrorism. 4  Only recently have studies shifted their focus to 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004), or Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and 
Younas (2014). 
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microeconomic effects. Our study extends this latter line of literature by showing that terrorist 
attacks have economically significant impacts on CEO compensation.  
2.  Sample Selection and Methodology 
2.1 Data and sample selection 
The data for this study are obtained from multiple sources. We obtain data on terrorist attacks 
from the Global Terrorism Database GTD (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/), an open-source 
database compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START), and located at the University of Maryland, that contains systematic data on 
domestic and international terrorist events around the world (START, 2016).5 From this database, 
we collect information on the date and location of each terrorist attack that occurred in the U.S. 
between 1992 and 2013. Appendix A provides a classification of the 569 terrorist attacks recorded 
in the U.S. during our sample period. The most frequent attacks occurred in 1995, when the number 
of attacks reached 62, decreasing to a relatively low level after 2006. The attack targets are usually 
businesses, private citizens, and property. Figure 1 shows the frequency of attacks by state. Overall, 
though terrorist attacks appear to occur in a large number of states, there is considerable variation 
between the states. California, in particular, was attacked most frequently (97 times).  
We obtain executive compensation data from the ExecuComp database. The dataset provides 
detailed information on salaries, bonuses, options and stock awards, and other compensation items. 
We obtain financial information from Compustat and stock price information from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
                                                 
5 According to the definition used by START, for inclusion in the database, “each incident... had to be an intentional act of violence 
or threat of violence by a non-state actor. In addition, two of the following three criteria also had to be met: 1. The violent act was 
aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and 3. The violent 
act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.” 
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Our final sample consists of 2,087 U.S. publicly listed firms for which we can identify the 
location of their headquarters and who have data in Compustat and CRSP (representing 22,561 
firm-year observations). 
2.2 Regression models 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), in our main tests, we use a difference-in-
difference model (DiD) to capture the impact of terrorist attacks on the level and composition of 
CEO compensation. We classify a firm as treated if the attack occurs within 100 miles of the firm’s 
headquarters and no other attack occurred within 100 miles of the same firm over the prior three 
years. To compute the distance to the attack, we manually collect latitude and longitudinal 
information on the location of the firm’s headquarters for all publicly listed firms. Then we 
calculate the distance between the coordinates of the firm’s headquarters and the locations of 
terrorist attacks following the procedure in Vincenty (1975). The control group includes the 
treatment firms before the attack and all remaining firms. We use the following empirical model: 
ln(CEO Pay Variable)it+1 = α + β1Attack Proximityit + β2Firm sizeit + β3Volatilityit + 
β4RET[-12,0]it + β5ROAit + β6M/B Ratioit + β7Cash/Assetsit + β8Leverageit + β9Capex/Assetsit + 
β10CEO Ageit + β11CEO Ownershipit + αi + δt + εit+1                          (1) 
where i indexes firms, t indexes year, the αis are firm fixed effects and the δts are year fixed effects.  
In measuring the effect on the level of overall CEO compensation, our dependent variable, 
ln(CEO Pay Variable)it+1, is the natural logarithm of CEO Total Pay for firm i in year t+1. Total 
Pay is the variable TDC1 in ExecuComp, consisting of salary, bonuses, value of restricted stocks 
granted, value of options granted (following Black and Scholes, 1973), long-term incentive 
payouts, and other types of compensation. TDC1 estimates the value of total compensation 
awarded (but not necessarily realized) to the executive that year. For robustness, we repeat our 
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analysis using an alternative pay measure, the Ex Post Pay. Ex Post Pay is the item TDC2 in 
ExecuComp. As described in Kaplan and Rauh (2010), TDC2 estimates the value of total 
compensation realized by the executive in a given year. This is the sum of salary, bonus, the value 
of restricted stock granted, the net value of stock options exercised, and the value of long-term 
incentive payouts. It is similar to TDC1 except that it replaces the value of options granted with 
the value of options exercised during the year.  
To analyze the effect on the structure of CEO compensation, we use two sets of variables. In 
an analysis of the levels of the CEO compensation components, the dependent variables are the 
natural logarithm of a CEO’s Salary, Bonus, value of restricted stock granted (Stock Value), value 
of options granted (Option Value), and long-term incentive payouts (LTIP Value). We further 
categorize the different components of compensation into two types: (1) cash compensation 
(natural logarithm of the sum of Salary and Bonus) and (2) equity-based compensation (natural 
logarithm of the sum of Stock Value, Option Value, and LTIP Value). We use the Cash to Total 
Compensation Ratio, defined as the proportion of cash compensation (sum of salary and bonus) in 
the total compensation, as a final dependent variable.  
Our primary analysis variable is Attack Proximity, a time-variant indicator variable that takes 
the value one for firms that are proximate to an attack only in the period after the attack. It takes 
the value zero for the treatment firms before the attack and for all the remaining firms. In 
robustness tests, we use alternative distances as cutoffs to define attack proximity (e. g., 30 miles, 
50 miles, or 200 miles as cutoffs, respectively), or we use only the first attack that is within 100 
miles of a firm as a treatment, but obtain similar results. 
Following the existing compensation literature (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
Deng and Gao, 2013), we control for a series of firm-specific characteristics in our model. Firm 
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Size is measured by the natural logarithm of firm sales and is expected to be positively related to 
compensation (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008). Volatility is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over the past 60 months and is expected to be positively related to 
compensation (Cyert, Kang, Kumar, and Shah, 1997). RET[-12,0] is the buy-and-hold return of a 
firm’s stock over the past 12 months. ROA refers to net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations divided by total assets. M/B Ratio is measured as the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity, in which the market value is obtained as the fiscal year 
closing price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. We expect RET[-12,0], ROA, 
and M/B Ratio to be positively related to compensation if CEO compensation is correlated with 
firm performance (Conyon, 2014). Cash/Assets is the ratio of cash items to total assets. Leverage 
is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets. Capex/Assets is the ratio 
of capital expenditures to total assets.  
The CEO-specific characteristics included in the specifications are CEO Age and CEO 
Ownership. Previous studies have used the CEO’s age as a proxy to measure the CEO horizon 
problem which can affect his or her preferences on compensation structure (e.g., Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992; Yim, 2013). CEO Ownership is the proportion of shares held by the CEO, 
excluding options, in shares outstanding. Given that the existing literature (e.g., Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker, 1999) finds a substitution effect between CEO stock ownership and annual 
compensation, we expect CEO Ownership to be negatively associated with CEO compensation. 
We also control for fixed differences between the control and treatment groups via firm and 
year fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control for all time invariant variables that might affect 
compensation (such as industry, location, or agency concerns), whereas time fixed effects control 
for time variation in compensation common to all firms in the sample. The standard errors are 
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clustered by firm and year (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). All monetary variables are 
measured in 2014 constant dollars. Detailed definitions of all variables used in this study are 
summarized in Appendix B.  
3.  Empirical results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis across three 
different groups: (1) the treatment firms in the years prior to the attacks; (2) the treatment firms in 
the years after the attacks; and (3) control firms that are not located near any attacks. 
Approximately 15.5% of firm-year observations are affected by terrorist attacks. The mean 
(median) CEO total pay is $5.9 ($3.9) million for treatment firms prior to the attack, in contrast to 
$7.3 ($5.1) million for treatment firms after the attack, and $5.3 ($3.3) million for control firms. 
The mean (median) cash-based pay is $1.6 ($1.1) million for treatment firms prior to the attack, 
$2.0 ($1.3) million for treatment firms after the attack, and $1.5 ($1.0) million for control firms. 
Similarly, the mean (median) level of equity-based pay is $3.2 ($1.1) million for treatment firms 
prior the attack, $4.0 ($1.8) million for treatment firms after the attack, and $2.9 ($1.0) million for 
control firms. 
Comparing the characteristics of the treated to the control firms, the control firms appear to 
be significantly different from the treatment firms prior to the attack across most firm 
characteristics, and the difference widens dramatically after the attack. Treated firms are 
significantly larger, earn higher operating returns, trade at higher market-to-book ratios, and have 
significantly lower volatility, cash levels, leverage and levels of capital expenditure. This is not 
entirely surprising. Terrorists are not likely to attack locations at random. They are probably 
likelier to attack larger and richer population centers. Firms located in these areas are more likely 
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to differ along firm characteristics from firms in non-attacked areas. To control for the effect of 
these omitted variables, we also use a PSM methodology where we include firm fixed effects to 
control for all time-invariant variables that might affect compensation, such as industry, location, 
or agency concerns, time fixed effects to control for time variation in compensation common to 
all firms in the sample, and time-varying firm traits such as size and leverage. To mitigate the 
effect of outliers in our subsequent tests, we also winsorize all firm-year continuous variables at 
the 1% and 99% levels, respectively. 
3.2 Effect of terrorist attacks on executive compensation levels 
Table 2 presents the baseline difference-in-difference regression results of the effect of 
terrorist attacks on total CEO pay. In each case, we control for firm and year fixed effects. Model 
(1) includes Attack Proximity as the only independent variable. The estimated coefficient on Attack 
Proximity is 0.099 and is significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms headquartered near 
terrorist attacks pay higher total compensation premia to their CEOs following the attack than 
before the attack or compared to firms located in safe locations.  
Model (2) adds several firm-specific control variables. Firm size has a significantly positive 
coefficient, consistent with the results in previous studies (Gabaix and Landier, 2008 or Tervio, 
2008). The coefficients on RET, ROA, and M/B Ratio are all significantly positive, suggesting that 
executives receive higher compensation when the firm performs well (Conyon, 2014). Even after 
adding these controls however, the coefficient on Attack Proximity is 0.108 and remains significant 
at the 1% level.   
Model (3) adds CEO-specific characteristics. While CEO age is insignificant, CEO 
Ownership is significantly negative, suggesting a substitution effect between CEO stock 
ownership and annual compensation (consistent with Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
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However, the coefficient on Attack Proximity continues to retain its significance. It is also 
economically significant. From Model (3), firms headquartered near terrorist attack locations pay 
about 11.5% higher6 CEO compensation premia after the attack than those headquartered in safe 
locations.  
Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman (2016) show that city size also affects the level of 
executive compensation. Firms located in large cities, where the costs of living are higher, may 
pay their CEOs more. Larger cities may also attract more terrorist attacks, either because a 
statistically larger number of terrorists may be located in larger population centers or because 
terrorists may target large population centers in order to attract publicity. Since our specifications 
include firms from both large and small cities, the results may be driven by a positive correlation 
between city size, CEO compensation, and the attractiveness of large cities to terrorists. Hence, 
following Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman (2016), we define Urban Agglomeration areas to 
include New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, 
Detroit, Dallas, and Houston. Model (4) of Table 2 shows that the interaction term between Attack 
Proximity and Urban Agglomeration is not statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of an 
attack on CEO compensation premia is present in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan firms. 
In the spirit of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), in Model (5) of Table 2, we examine how 
the effect of attack proximity changes over time. Specifically, we replace the Attack Proximity 
indicator with seven indicator variables: Before-3, Before-2, Before-1, Current, After+1, After+2 and 
After3+. These variables indicate the year relative to the occurrence of the attack events. For 
example, Before-3 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from three years (year -3) 
before the attack and zero otherwise, Current is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation 
                                                 
6 Since the coefficient on Attack Proximity is 0.109, and the estimated constant is 5.610, we obtain e(0.109+5.610)/e5.610-1=11.5%.  
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is from the year (year 0) of the attack and zero otherwise, while After3+ is a dummy that equals one 
if a firm-year observation is at least three years after the attack and zero otherwise. The model is 
estimated as follows: 
ln(CEO Pay Variable)it+1 = α + β1 Before-3 + β2 Before-2 +β3 Before-1 + β4 Current +β5 After+1 
+ β6 After+2 + β7 After3+ + Firm and CEO characteristics Controls +αi + δt + εit+1 (2) 
The coefficients on Before-3, Before-2, and Before-1 are all insignificant. In contrast, the 
coefficient of Current is significant and positive at the 5% level while coefficients of After+1, and 
After+2 are significant and positive at the 1% level, again implying that firms located near the attack 
location pay higher compensation to CEOs following the attack compared to firms located farther 
away from the attack location. The difference in the significance of the lag and lead dummies show 
that the results are not driven by reverse causality. In particular, this test shows that there is no 
evidence of an increase in compensation before the attack occurs, which provides additional 
confirmation that the attacks really are exogenous. Overall, the findings suggest that the increase 
in CEO pay is causally affected by the terrorist attack. 
3.3 PSM method 
We next construct a treatment and control group of firms using a propensity score matching 
(PSM) method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). For each treatment sample firm (Proximity=1), we 
select a matched sample firm (Proximity=0) with the closest propensity score. We match firms 
located near terrorist attack scenes with firms with similar characteristics located farther away 
from such scenes within the same state. The matching criteria include all firm characteristics that 
Table 1 shows are different for the two sets of firms (size, stock returns and volatility, ROA, the 
market-to-book ratio, cash holdings, leverage and capital expenditures), CEO characteristics (age 
and stockholdings), and year and industry fixed effects. To maintain the statistical independence 
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of our tests, we implement a nearest neighbor matching (NNM) algorithm without replacement 
and match firms with similar propensity scores. The NNM algorithm uses the distance between 
covariate patterns to define the “closest” neighbor. In particular, each firm located near terrorist 
attack scenes (labeled a treatment firm) is matched to a firm located farther away from such scenes 
within the same state. Once a matching sample firm is selected in the control sample, it is removed 
from the matching pool. We keep only the firms that were matched.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports parameter estimates from the probit model used to estimate 
propensity scores for firms in the treatment and control groups. The dependent variable is one if 
the firm-year belongs to the treatment group, and zero otherwise. We use the predicted 
probabilities or propensity scores in Column (1) to perform NNM matching. We obtain 566 unique 
pairs of matched firms. We next conduct a number of diagnostic tests to verify that we do not 
violate the parallel trends assumption in a DiD estimate. We first re-run the probit model using the 
matched 566 matched pairs. Column (2) of Panel A in Table 3 presents the probit estimates. None 
of the independent variables are statistically significant while the pseudo-R2 drops drastically to 
0.53%. Second, we examine the differences between the propensity scores of the treatment firms 
and those of the matched control firms. Panel B demonstrates that the differences are trivial. For 
example, the maximum distance between the two matched firms’ propensity scores is only 0.001. 
Finally, Panel C reports univariate comparisons between the treatment and control firms’ pre-
attack characteristics and their corresponding t-statistics. None of the differences are significant, 
implying that the characteristics of treatment and control firm groups are similar. Overall, the 
diagnostic tests reported in Panel A – C show that the PSM process appears to remove obvious 
sample selection biases, increasing the likelihood that the changes in CEO compensation are 
caused by an exogenous terrorist attack.  
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Panel D of Table 3 presents the DiD estimators. Column (1) reports the average change in the 
CEO compensation for the treatment group. These measures are computed by first subtracting the 
CEO compensation in the pre-attack period from that in the post-attack period for each treatment 
firm. The differences are then averaged over the treatment group. Similarly, in Column (2), we 
calculate the average change in the CEO compensation for the control group. In Column (3) and 
(4), we report the DiD estimators and the corresponding two-tailed t-statistics testing the null 
hypothesis that the DiD estimators are zero. The results in Panel D show that, although the CEO 
compensation at both treatment and control firms increases after the attack, the increase in CEO 
compensation is significantly larger for the treatment group than for the control group. 
Using the treatment and PSM matched control groups, we present DiD regression results in 
Panel E. Column (1) shows that the coefficient of Attack Proximity is 0.108 and significant at the 
1% level, a result that is qualitatively very similar to those in Table 2. In Column (2), as in Model 
(5) of Table 2, we replace the Attack Proximity indicator with the seven indicator variables before 
and after the attack. Again, the coefficients on Before-3, Before-2, and Before-1 are all insignificant, 
implying that the parallel trend assumption of the treatment and control groups is not violated. In 
contrast, the coefficient of Current, After+1, and After+2 are significant and positive, again implying 
that firms located near the attack location pay higher compensation to CEOs following the attack 
than firms located farther away from the attacks.  
We note that by controlling for location fixed effects (through firm fixed effects), we control 
for the greatest factor in the variation in the likelihood of an attack. However, we do not control 
for time variation in the likelihood of an attack. The threat to our identification strategy is that 
CEO compensation increased in the same year as the attack because an omitted variable drove 
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both the attack and the rise in CEO compensation at the same time. Though this seems unlikely to 
be a significant concern, we caution that our DiD methodology is not perfect. 
3.4 Alternative measures of compensation and attack proximity  
Table 4 reports results using alternative measures of compensation and attack proximity. In 
Panel A, we report difference-in-difference regression results using alternative measures of CEO 
compensation. The variable Ex Post Pay is the item TDC2 in ExecuComp. As in Table 2, Model 
(1) of Panel A includes Attack Proximity as the only independent variable. In Model (2) and Model 
(3), we add several firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables. The coefficients on Attack 
Proximity are 0.127, 0.139, and 0.138, respectively, and are all statistically significant, suggesting 
that the pay premium for terrorist attacks is robust to using alternative measures of CEO 
compensation. 
Panel B reports difference-in-difference regression results using alternative measures of 
attack proximity. In the first three columns, Attack Proximity is constructed using alternative 
distances of 30 miles, 50 miles, and 200 miles as cutoffs to differentiate whether the firm is affected 
by the terrorist attack. In the last column, we report results only using the first attack that is within 
100 miles of a firm. Re-estimating Equation (1) using these alternative measures shows that the 
coefficients on Attack Proximity retain their significance. 
Panel C uses Ln(Distance) as the attack variable, instead of a dummy, to measure the intensity 
of exposure to the attacks. Based on the PSM matched sample in Table 3, we calculate the distance 
from the location of the treatment and control firms to the nearest attack location in a given year.7 
Model (1) of Panel C in Table 4 includes Ln(Distance) as the only independent variable. Models 
                                                 
7 For example, if the distance between the firm and the attack is less than 80 miles, then the distance variable takes the value of 0 
prior to the attack, and ln(80) after the attack. We set the distance variable equal to 0 if the firm is not affected by the attack. 
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(2) and (3) add several firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables. The coefficients on 
Ln(Distance) are all significantly negative, suggesting that firms located further from an attack 
location are less affected by the attack. 
Table 5 reports only the coefficients on Attack Proximity from the DiD regressions in Model 
3 Table 2 after varying distances to the attack and periods around the attack. As the table shows, 
the effect disappears around 250 miles away and within 2 years after the attack. For attacks 
between 150-250 miles away, the effect disappears within 1 year after the attack. In all cases, the 
increase in CEO compensation in year 2 is significant only at the 10% level. 
Finally, we note that the definition of our primary measure of total compensation, the 
ExecuComp item TDC1, has changed slightly since 2006. Hence, we follow Walker (2011) to 
reconcile the TDC1 definitions between 1992-2005 and 2006-2013. In an untabulated test, we find 
our conclusions remain unchanged. 
3.5 Effects on the composition of compensation 
We next investigate whether terrorist attacks influence the composition of CEO compensation. 
Prior studies show that terrorist attacks can adversely affect the performance of financial markets 
and macroeconomic activities (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides, 
2004; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas, 2014; or Chesney, Reshetar, and Karaman, 2011). 
Given that salaries and bonuses are more likely to be effective compensation methods for the short-
term than long-term stocks/options, it is plausible that CEOs prefer cash compensation to avoid 
uncertainty and bear reduced personal risks.  
Table 6 presents coefficients from a difference-in-difference regression of the influence of 
terrorist attacks on the CEO compensation composition. Models (1) and (2) examine the effect of 
terrorist attacks on CEOs’ cash compensation (e.g., salary and bonus). In Model (1), the coefficient 
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on Attack Proximity is 0.135 and significant at the 1% level, indicating that the base salary of CEOs 
of companies near terrorist attacks is approximately 14.5% higher than those of CEOs in safer 
locations. Model (2) shows a similar significantly positive association between Attack Proximity 
and Ln(Bonus). The coefficient of Attack Proximity is 0.197, indicating a 21.8% bonus premium 
after an attack for CEOs of firms headquartered within a radius of 100 miles from an attack 
compared with those at firms in safer locations. This increased effect on bonuses relative to salaries 
may be driven by a trade-off between CEO preferences against shareholder interests. Although 
bonuses are earned annually, to some extent, performance-based or revenue target-based bonuses 
may be regarded as short-term performance-based incentives. Not surprisingly, Model (3) also 
reveals a significantly positive association between Attack Proximity and total cash compensation 
(cash salary plus bonus). 
Models (4) to (6) use the values of restricted stock and options granted as well as long-term 
incentive payouts as dependent variables to measure the CEOs’ equity-based compensation. None 
of the coefficients on Attack Proximity are significant, implying that CEOs of companies located 
near terrorist attacks generally do not receive an equity-based compensation premium. We sum all 
the forms of equity-based compensation and repeat the regression in Model (7) but the coefficient 
on Attack Proximity remains insignificant. Finally, in Model (8), we use the Cash to Total 
Compensation Ratio as the dependent variable. Again, the coefficient on Attack Proximity is 
significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting that the proportion of salaries and bonuses 
increases significantly as a response to terrorist attacks.  
Overall, our results do not show a substitution effect from risky compensation to cash 
compensation. The level of option-based compensation does not decrease. Instead, the results show 
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that the increase in cash compensation following terrorist attacks drives the overall increases in 
total compensation documented earlier. 
4.  Why does the compensation structure change in response to terrorist attacks?   
Prior studies have shown that terrorist attacks can adversely affect macroeconomic conditions 
and the performance of financial markets. A potential reduction in stock returns and the associated 
values of stock options may lead executives to reduce their preference for long-term incentive 
contracts (involving stock grants or stock options), instead displaying a preference for cash awards. 
Similarly, if the adverse effects on firms increase the likelihood of financial distress, the increased 
uncertainty caused by terrorist attacks may cause executives to adopt more conservative corporate 
policies. Finally, attack related uncertainty may also impact the value of a manager’s human capital, 
which is correlated with the firm’s stock performance when a large part of executive compensation 
is granted in the form of stock. For all these reasons, subsequent to the attack, CEOs may prefer to 
be granted a larger share of their compensation in the form of cash payments to avoid adverse 
impacts on stock-based payments. 
4.1 Do other company policies change in response to the attacks? 
We first examine if managers adopt more conservative financial policies following terrorist 
attacks. Dessaint and Matray (2017) document that managers of neighboring firms increase 
corporate cash holdings in response to hurricane events. They argue that the increases in cash 
holdings demonstrate an irrational response by managers who overestimate the actual risk of 
hurricane events. In this section, we examine the levels of cash holdings and other company 
financial policies, such as leverage, net working capital, R&D, investment, accounts payable, and 
accounts receivable. Dessaint and Matray (2017) include firm-quarter fixed effects to account for 
seasonality in hurricane activity. Though a priori, terrorist attacks may appear unlikely to be 
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seasonal, it can be argued that terrorist attacks are more likely to occur in larger gatherings of 
people (around holidays, for example). Hence, following Dessaint and Matray (2017), we retain 
firm-quarter observations for a seventeen-quarter window centered on the attack event quarter, and 
replicate our difference-in-difference analysis. Table 7 reports our results. 
Panel A reports the results of financial policies in the immediate quarter t+1 following the 
terrorist attacks. Accounts payable and accounts receivable appear to slightly decrease following 
the attacks. No other firm policy variable is significantly affected by the attacks. Panel B examines 
detailed changes at the quarter level but finds no consistent effects. CEOs do not appear to adopt 
more conservative financial policies following an attack. Hence, our results appear less consistent 
with the hypothesis that managers irrationally overestimate the risk of future attacks and change 
their operational policies. The results also do not appear consistent with the hypothesis that the 
impact of conservative financial policy adoption on option values explains why CEOs prefer 
increases in cash compensation to option compensation. They seem more consistent with CEOs 
directly quantifying a non-monetary factor that affects their own life without considering the 
impact on the firm.  
4.2 Are shareholders affected by the attacks? 
We next investigate if a potential reduction in stock returns and the associated values of stock 
options might lead executives to reduce their preference for long-term incentive contracts, instead 
displaying a preference for cash compensation. Specifically, we examine whether terrorist attacks 
affect shareholder wealth. Using the PSM matched sample, we conduct an event study and 
compute long-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), defined as the monthly return to the 
treatment firm minus the monthly return of the PSM-matched control firm. Table 8 reports the 
results. Across different post-attack windows (6, 8, 10, and 12 months), we find that firms affected 
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by the terrorist attack underperform relative to their matched peers. The findings show that 
shareholders of affected firms seem to suffer following the terrorist attack and the subsequent 
increase in CEO compensation. Hence, it appears plausible that rational CEOs anticipate the 
reduction in their equity-based compensation values and demand an increase in cash compensation.  
However, several mechanisms might lie behind this effect and absent any exogenous variation 
in the mechanisms, it is difficult to distinguish between them. For example, the increase in pay 
may be due to a direct wealth transfer from shareholders to the CEO. Since there are no changes 
in firm policy, it appears that CEOs do not believe that the attacks are likely to impact the firm. 
However, it is also plausible that causality runs from the structure of pay to effort to stock returns 
– that an increase in the proportion of cash-based compensation relative to stock-based 
compensation reduces the incentive of the CEO to work harder. Finally, it is plausible that 
managers are irrationally under-reacting to terrorist attacks by not changing firm policy, causing 
the firm’s subsequent poor performance. 
5.  Do more powerful CEOs obtain more pay?   
The ability of CEOs to extract higher compensation may not be uniform but related to CEO 
bargaining power. In this section, we examine when CEOs are able to extract compensation for 
changes in non-monetary factors. Specifically, we examine whether CEO power increases the 
ability of the CEO to earn compensation premia for negative shocks to non-monetary factors that 
affect the CEO’s quality of life. 
To analyze how CEO bargaining power affects the impact of terrorist attacks on CEO pay, 
we use three standard measures of CEO bargaining power taken from the corporate governance 
literature. Following Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), we use the ratio of total CEO 
compensation to the highest compensation earned by any other executive in the firm, the Pay Gap, 
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to measure CEO power. We also use a measure of turnover that we call Excess Turnover, which 
is computed as the difference between Forced Turnover and Expected Forced Turnover.8 The 
variable Forced Turnover equals one if the age of the CEO on his or her departure is less than 60 
years and zero otherwise (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; Campbell et al., 2011). The 
assumption is that powerful CEOs are much less likely to make a forced departure from the firm 
than less powerful CEOs. Finally, we use the CEO’s tenure (CEO Tenure) as a third proxy for 
CEO power because the ability to influence company decisions likely increases with greater tenure 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004; van Essen et al., 2015; Abernethy et al., 2015). 
Table 9 reports the DiD regression results. In Column (1), the interaction term between Attack 
Proximity × Pay Gap is significantly positive, indicating that powerful CEOs get higher pay 
increases after the attack. In Column (2), the interaction term Attack Proximity × Excess Turnover 
is negative and significant at the 5% level, implying that CEOs who are much less likely to be 
forced out, also earn a higher CEO total compensation following the attack. Similarly, in Column 
(3), the coefficient on the interaction term Attack Proximity × CEO Tenure is significantly positive, 
indicating that CEOs with longer tenures who are presumably more powerful, obtain higher pay 
increases. 
6.  How do the attacks affect other executives and employees? 
In previous sections, we provide robust evidence that the CEOs are paid more compensation 
in response to the terrorist attack. We also show that more powerful CEOs obtain greater pay 
increases. The straightforward question is whether the extra compensation for the CEO is also 
correlated with higher pay for other executives and employees. The answer appears to be no.  
                                                 
8 To compute this variable, using the entire sample of 22,561 firm-year observations, we first compute the probability of a CEO 
forced turnover event, then obtain the Expected Forced Turnover as the predicted probability of Forced Turnover, and finally 
compute the Excess Turnover variable for each firm.  
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Table 10 presents results from DiD regressions of the influence of terrorist attacks on other 
executives and employees’ compensation. The variable Ln(Other Executive Pay)it+1 is measured 
as the natural logarithm of average executives’ total pay (excluding the CEO) for firm i in year 
t+1. We also examine the relation between the post-attack increase in CEO pay and the pay for 
other executives. Column (2) in Table 9 Panel B shows that while other executives get higher pay 
when the CEO is paid more, attack proximity reduces the magnitude of this increase. In Column 
(3), our dependent variable is Ln(Employee Pay)it+1, computed as the natural logarithm of average 
rank-and-file employee compensation for firm i in year t+1.9 Overall, we find that while employee 
salary doesn’t change significantly, other executive pay appears to be negatively affected by 




This study provides novel evidence on the effect of terrorist attacks on CEO compensation. 
Based on previous studies that discuss the consequences of terrorism and how terrorist attacks 
influence managerial emotion and corporate policies, we conjecture that such negative events 
influence both CEO compensation levels and compensation structure.  
Using a sample of terrorist attacks from 1992 to 2013, our difference-in-difference models 
show that terrorist attacks cause an increase in CEO compensation. CEOs of companies located 
near terrorist attacks prefer higher levels of cash compensation (salary and bonus) over equity-
based compensation (stocks and options) than CEOs of companies located in safer locations. While 
                                                 
9 When using Ln(Employee Pay) as our dependent variable, the number of observations decreases dramatically because many 
firms do not disclose their payment to rank-and-file employees.   
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there is no decrease in equity-based compensation, an increase in cash compensation drives an 
increase in total overall compensation following terrorist attacks. 
We further examine if managers adopt more conservative financial policies following terrorist 
attacks. We find no evidence of a change in financial policies. CEOs appear to directly quantify a 
non-monetary factor that affects their own life without considering the impact on the firm. Further 
tests find that firms affected by terrorist attacks underperform relative to their matched peers, 
implying that shareholders of affected firms seem to suffer following an attack and the subsequent 
increase in CEO compensation. Finally, we show that variations in the premia are affected by 
variations in the bargaining power of the CEO, suggesting that powerful CEOs are better able to 
extract compensation premia in response to negative shocks to non-monetary factors that 
potentially affect their quality of life. We find no such premium for other executives and rank-and-
file employees. 
Our study enhances our understanding of how specific non-monetary factors affect CEO 
compensation and how risk affects CEO compensation. Our study extends the literature of the 
micro-impact of terrorist attacks by showing that terrorist attacks also significantly impact 
executive compensation policy. 
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Appendix A: Terrorist Attack Events Description 
This table presents descriptive statistics of terrorist events from 1992 – 2013. Panel A presents the 
distribution by attack type and Panel B presents the frequency of terrorist attacks by year. 
 
Panel A: Distribution by Attack Type 
Attack type Frequency Percent
Armed Assault 48 8.44
Assassination 21 3.69
Bombing/Explosion 138 24.25
Facility/Infrastructure Attack 296 52.02
Hijacking 6 1.05
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident) 14 2.46
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) 3 0.53




Panel B: Distribution by Year 
Year No. of Attacks Proportion of total
1992 31 5.45 
1993 0 0.00 
1994 56 9.84 
1995 62 10.9 
1996 36 6.33 
1997 39 6.85 
1998 26 4.57 
1999 53 9.31 
2000 33 5.80 
2001 39 6.85 
2002 33 5.80 
2003 32 5.62 
2004 9 1.58 
2005 23 4.04 
2006 6 1.05 
2007 9 1.58 
2008 19 3.34 
2009 11 1.93 
2010 17 2.99 
2011 9 1.58 
2012 12 2.11 
2013 14 2.46 
Total 569 100 
 
 
Appendix B: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Attack Proximity Variables  
Attack Proximity Dummy variable that takes value 1 for affected firms after a terrorist 
attack has occurred, and zero prior to the event. The affected firms 
are those firms that are headquartered within 100 miles of the 
location of the terrorist events and at least three years have elapsed 
since the last attack.
 
Pay Variables 
Total Pay Item TDC1 in ExecuComp that consists of salary, bonus, value of 
restricted stocks granted, value of options granted, long-term 
incentive payouts, and other types of compensation 
Ex Post Pay Item TDC2 in ExecuComp that is similar to TDC1, except that it 
replaces the value of options granted with the value of options 
exercised during the given year
Salary Value of salary (item SALARY in ExecuComp, $M)
Bonus Value of bonus (item BONUS in ExecuComp, $M) 
Option Value Value of options granted using Black-Scholes (item 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE in ExecuComp, $M)
Stock Value Value of restricted stocks granted (item RSTKGRNT in ExecuComp, 
$M)
LTIP Value Value of long-term incentive payouts (item LTIP in ExecuComp, 
$M)
Equity based pay Sum of option value, stock value and LTIP value 
Cash to total compensation ratio Sum of salary and bonus divided by total compensation
 
 
Firm Characteristics Variables 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets from Compustat (item AT in 
Compustat)
Volatility Standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns over the 
previous 5-year period 
RET Buy-and-hold return on a firm’s stock for the past 12 months
ROA Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
divided by total assets (item IB/AT in Compustat) 
M/B Ratio Market value of equity divided by book value of equity, where the 
market value is obtained as the fiscal year closing price multiplied by 
common shares outstanding (item PRC×SHROUT/CEQ in 
Compustat)
Cash/Assets Ratio of cash items to total assets (item CHE/AT in Compustat)
Leverage Sum of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets 
(item (DLT+DLTT)/AT in Compustat) 




CEO Age Age of the executive in ExecuComp
 
 
CEO Ownership Ratio of shares owned by the CEO, excluding options owned, to 
shares outstanding (item SHROWN_TOT_PCT in ExecuComp)
 
Neighborhood Characteristics 
Urban Agglomeration Dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm is headquartered in 
New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, 
Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, or Houston CMSA, following 
Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman (2016). 
  
Other Executives and Employee Pay variables 
Other Executive Pay Average executive total pay measured as item TDC1 in ExecuComp, 
excluding the CEO.
Other Executive Age Average executive age, excluding the CEO.  
Other Executive Ownership Average ratio of shares owned by executives, excluding the CEO 
(item SHROWN_TOT_PCT in ExecuComp). 
Employee Pay Average compensation earned by all employees (excluding the 
executives disclosed in corporate filings). (item XLR in Compustat)
 
CEO Power Variables  
Pay Gap Ratio of total CEO compensation to the highest compensation earned 
by any other executive in the firm. 
Excess Turnover Computed as the difference between Forced Turnover and Expected 
Forced Turnover. The variable Forced Turnover, equals one if the 
age of the CEO on his or her departure is less than 60 years and zero 
otherwise. We first examine the probability of a CEO forced 
turnover event, then obtain the Expected Forced Turnover as the 
predicted probability of Forced Turnover, and compute the Excess 
Turnover.





Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Column (a) reports mean and median values 
for the firm-years before the terrorist attacks for all firms affected by the attacks. Column (b) reports mean and median values for the firm-years 
after the terrorist attacks for all firms affected by the attacks. Column (c) reports mean and median values for the firm-years of control firms who 
are not affected by a terrorist attack. Columns (d) and (e) report results from mean and median difference tests between column (a) and (c) and 
column (b) and (c), respectively. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Treated Group       
 Before attack (a)  
After attack 
(b)  
Control Group  
(c) 
 (a) vs. (c)  
(d)
 (b) vs. (c) 
(e)
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Compensation    
Total Payt+1($M) 5.866 3.864  7.296 5.092  5.288 3.293 0.578*** 0.571***  2.008*** 1.799*** 
Salaryt+1($M) 0.937 0.900  1.031 0.992  0.851 0.788 0.086*** 0.112***  0.180*** 0.204*** 
Bonust+1($M) 0.707 0.158  0.945 0.272  0.606 0.017 0.101*** 0.141***  0.339*** 0.255*** 
Cash-based payt+1($M) 1.644 1.134  1.976 1.302  1.457 1.002 0.187*** 0.132***  0.519*** 0.300*** 
Option Value t+1($M) 2.336 0.672  2.837 1.071  2.147 0.575 0.189* 0.097***  0.690*** 0.496*** 
Stock Valuet+1($M) 0.472 0.001  0.638 0.001  0.409 0.001 0.063** 0.000***  0.229*** 0.000*** 
LTIP Valuet+1($M) 0.214 0.001  0.276 0.001  0.178 0.001 0.036** 0.000  0.098*** 0.000*** 
Equity-based payt+1($M) 3.227 1.142  4.027 1.775  2.912 0.966 0.315** 0.176***  1.115*** 0.809*** 
Cash to total compensation ratiot+1 0.860 0.858  0.871 0.871  0.855 0.856 0.005** 0.002  0.016*** 0.015*** 
Other Executive Pay t+1($M) 2.435 1.486  2.945 1.934  2.156 1.336 0.279*** 0.150***  0.789*** 0.598*** 
Employee Pay t+1($M) 0.094 0.080  0.103 0.084  0.077 0.071 0.010*** 0.006***  0.019*** 0.010*** 
        
Firm Characteristics        
Firm sizet 8.071 8.022  8.522 8.464  7.821 7.695 0.250*** 0.327***  0.701*** 0.769*** 
Volatilityt 0.104 0.092  0.105 0.092  0.119 0.107 -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.014*** -0.015*** 
RET[-12,0]t 0.159 0.123  0.148 0.115  0.161 0.114 -0.002 0.009  -0.013 0.001 
ROAt 0.048 0.050  0.046 0.048  0.040 0.042 0.008*** 0.008***  0.006*** 0.006*** 
M/B Ratiot 3.177 2.332  3.429 2.424  2.800 2.078 0.377*** 0.254***  0.629*** 0.346*** 
Cash/Assetst 0.121 0.064  0.117 0.066  0.136 0.069 -0.015*** -0.005***  -0.019*** -0.003*** 
Leveraget 0.346 0.313  0.351 0.322  0.358 0.303 -0.012* 0.010  -0.007 0.019* 
Capex/Assetst 0.047 0.036  0.046 0.037  0.052 0.036 -0.005*** 0.000  -0.006*** 0.001 
        
 
 
CEO Characteristics        
CEO Aget 56.488 57.000  56.713 57.000  55.986 56.000 0.502*** 1.000***  0.727*** 1.000*** 
CEO Ownershipt 1.948 0.069  1.619 0.035  2.032 0.200 -0.084 -0.131***  -0.413*** -0.165*** 
 
 
Table 2. Effect of terrorist attacks on the level of CEO compensation  
 
This table presents coefficients from difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions of the effect of terrorist attacks 
on executive compensation. The dependent variable is Ln(Total Pay)t+1. The treatment group includes all firms 
that are affected by the attacks that have occurred at time t, specifically, firms that are headquartered within 100 
miles of the location of the terrorist events and at least three years have elapsed since the last attack. The control 
group includes the treatment firms before time t and all remaining firms. Before-t is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in the year t before the attack if the county of the firm headquarters is in the area hit by an attack during year t. 
After+t is defined similarly for the year t (t=1,2) after the attack. After3+ is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year 
observation is at least three years after the attack and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
B. P-values clustered by firm and year are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  
Attack Proximity 0.099*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
















Firm characteristics  
Firm size 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.245***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.047 0.078 0.078 0.074
 (0.863) (0.777) (0.777) (0.787)
RET[-12,0] 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.148***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.459*** 0.461*** 0.461*** 0.462***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B Ratio 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash/Assets -0.056 -0.059 -0.059 -0.056
 (0.451) (0.432) (0.432) (0.457)
Leverage -0.229*** -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.225***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capex/Assets 0.248 0.253 0.253 0.262
 (0.233) (0.225) (0.226) (0.209)
 
 
CEO characteristics  
CEO Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
 (0.197) (0.193) (0.199)
CEO Ownership -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 22,561 22,561 22,561 22,561 22,561





Table 3. PSM results 
This table reports coefficients from difference-in-difference (DiD) tests examining the effect of terrorist 
attacks on executive compensation. The treatment group consists of firms affected by the attack, as defined 
in Table 2, while the control group consists of firms in the same state but not affected by the attacks. We 
match firms using one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching, without replacement. Panel A 
presents parameter estimates from the probit model used to estimate propensity scores for firms in the 
treatment and control groups. The dependent variable is one if the firm-year belongs to the treatment group, 
and zero otherwise. Industry fixed effects are included in both columns in Panel A. Panel B reports the 
distribution of estimated propensity scores for the treatment firms, control firms, and the difference in 
estimated post-matched propensity scores. Panel C reports univariate comparisons between the treatment 
and control firms’ characteristics and their corresponding t-statistics. Panel D reports differences in 
compensation changes before and after the attack, between treatment and control groups. Panel E reports 
coefficients from DiD regressions. Before-t and After+t dummies are defined as in Table 2. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix B. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Pre-match propensity score regression and post-match diagnostic regression 
 






Firm characteristics  
Firm sizet-1 0.101*** 0.017 
 (0.005) (0.693) 
Volatilityt-1 -4.170*** -0.108 
 (0.001) (0.942) 
RET[-12,0] t-1 0.232* -0.043 
 (0.063) (0.777) 
ROA t-1 -0.142 -0.513 
 (0.807) (0.550) 
M/B Ratiot-1 0.086*** -0.025 
 (0.000) (0.309) 
Cash/Assetst-1 -1.044** -0.211 
 (0.013) (0.671) 
Leveraget-1 -0.495*** 0.081 
 (0.008) (0.731) 
Capex/Assetst-1 -0.693 0.226 
 (0.583) (0.884) 
CEO characteristics  
CEO Aget-1 0.003 0.000 
 (0.689) (0.989) 
CEO Ownershipt-1 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.845) (0.564) 
Intercept Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Obs 2,168 1,132 









Obs. Min p5 p50 Mean SD P95 Max 
Treatment 566 0.038 0.133 0.335 0.332 0.125 0.534 0.651 
Control 566 0.038 0.133 0.335 0.338 0.135 0.578 0.751 
Difference - -0.100 -0.043 0.000 -0.005 0.018 0.000 0.001 
 
 
Panel C: Differences in firm characteristics before attacks occur 
 
 
Panel D: Difference in CEO pay from before to after the attack 
 
 
Mean Treatment  
Difference 
(After – Before) 
Mean Control  
Difference 
(After – Before)
Mean DiD  
Estimator 
(Treat – Control)
t-statistic for DiD 
 Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Total Pay)t+1 0.435*** 0.240*** 0.195*** 5.351 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.037)  
 
 
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
Firm sizet-1 7.979 7.936 0.043 0.433 
Volatilityt-1 0.111 0.112 -0.000 -0.012 
RET[-12,0] t-1 0.084 0.102 -0.017 -0.689 
ROA t-1 0.044 0.048 -0.005 -1.012 
M/B Ratiot-1 2.982 3.180 -0.198 -1.213 
Cash/Assetst-1 0.132 0.136 -0.004 -0.472 
Leveraget-1 0.338 0.331 0.007 0.379 
Capex/Assetst-1 0.049 0.050 -0.001 -0.458 
CEO Aget-1 56.500 56.527 -0.027 -0.063 
CEO Ownershipt-1 2.045 2.282 -0.237 -0.745 
 
 
Panel E: DiD regression with PSM matched sample 
 
Dependent variable Ln(Total Pay) t+1 
 (1) (2) 
Attack Proximity 0.108***  















Firm characteristics  
Firm size 0.250*** 0.248*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 0.144 0.140 
 (0.696) (0.702) 
RET[-12,0] 0.130*** 0.130*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.378*** 0.377*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
M/B Ratio 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash/Assets 0.026 0.032 
 (0.835) (0.802) 
Leverage -0.277*** -0.274*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Capex/Assets 0.432 0.448 
 (0.139) (0.122) 
CEO characteristics  
CEO Age -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.288) (0.305) 
CEO Ownership -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.068) (0.069) 
Intercept Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes 
Obs 10,792 10,792 
Adj. R2 0.7060 0.7066 
 
 
Table 4. Effect of terrorist attacks on CEO compensation: Robustness tests 
This table presents coefficients from difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions of the effect of terrorist 
attacks on executive compensation using an alternative measure of executive compensation (Panel A), 
alternative measures of attack proximity (Panel B), and distance to the attacks as the dependent variable 
(Panel C). The treatment and control groups are defined as in Table 2. All variables are defined in Appendix 
B. P-values clustered by firm and year are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative measure of executive compensation 
 
  Ln(Ex Post Pay) t+1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Attack Proximity 0.127*** 0.139*** 0.138***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm characteristics  





















Intercept Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes Yes
Obs 22,561 22,561 22,561





Panel B: Alternative measures of attack proximity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Attack Proximity 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.097*** 0.103**
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Firm characteristics  
Firm size 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.234*** 0.243***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.109 0.171 0.141 0.055
 (0.700) (0.553) (0.628) (0.844)
RET[-12,0] 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.144***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.484*** 0.481*** 0.449*** 0.427***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B Ratio 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.022***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash/Assets -0.024 -0.040 -0.072 -0.046
 (0.769) (0.622) (0.404) (0.517)
Leverage -0.217*** -0.233*** -0.242*** -0.226***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capex/Assets 0.245 0.209 0.322 0.248
 (0.241) (0.320) (0.132) (0.243)
CEO characteristics  
CEO Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
 (0.202) (0.151) (0.511) (0.360)
CEO Ownership -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006**
 (0.016) (0.034) (0.049) (0.017)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 20,590 21,354 19,222 22,561




Panel C: Using distance to the attacks as the attack variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Distance) -0.015** -0.015*** -0.015***
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.009)
Firm characteristics  





















Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 10,584 10,584 10,584




Table 5. Two-way attack proximity coefficient matrix for varying distances and periods around the attacks 
This table presents coefficients from difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions (Table 2 Model 3) of the effect of terrorist attacks on executive 
compensation. The dependent variable is Ln(Total Pay) measured over different years from one year before to three years after the attack. The treatment 
group includes all firms that are affected by the attacks that have occurred at time t, specifically, firms that are headquartered within the specified number 
of miles of the location of the terrorist events and at least three years have elapsed since the last attack. The control group includes the treatment firms 
before time t and all remaining firms. In each case, we control for firm and CEO characteristics and firm and year fixed effects. P-values clustered by firm 
and year are in parentheses. Significant variables are bolded. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable Ln(Total Pay) t-1 Ln(Total Pay) t Ln(Total Pay) t+1 Ln(Total Pay) t+2 Ln(Total Pay) t+3
Attack proximity (within 30 miles) 0.003 0.003 0.110*** 0.044* -0.020
 (0.903) (0.914) (0.000) (0.082) (0.413)
Attack proximity (within 50 miles) -0.003 -0.007 0.108*** 0.054* -0.010
 (0.882) (0.670) (0.000) (0.063) (0.670)
Attack proximity (within 100 miles) 0.002 -0.012 0.109*** 0.052* -0.035
 (0.891) (0.392) (0.000) (0.072) (0.181)
Attack proximity (within 150 miles) 0.000 -0.009 0.084*** 0.040* -0.014
 (0.985) (0.574) (0.000) (0.077) (0.507)
Attack proximity (within 200 miles) 0.013 -0.003 0.097*** 0.031 -0.032
 (0.476) (0.852) (0.000) (0.255) (0.206)
Attack proximity (within 250 miles) 0.000 -0.009 0.048*** 0.018 -0.022
 (0.985) (0.574) (0.005) (0.364) (0.261)
Attack proximity (within 300 miles) 0.039 0.021 0.001 -0.018 -0.038
 (0.144) (0.342) (0.959) (0.507) (0.258)
Attack proximity (within 400 miles) 0.036 0.024 0.014 -0.015 -0.029
  (0.191) (0.343) (0.643) (0.642) (0.457)
 
 
Table 6. Effect of terrorist attacks on the composition of CEO compensation 
This table presents coefficients from a difference-in-difference (DiD) regression of the effect of terrorist attacks on the composition of executive 
compensation. The dependent variable Attack Proximity is defined as in Table 2. All variables are defined in Appendix B. P-values clustered by firm and 
year are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Ln(Salary) t+1 Ln(Bonus) t+1 
Ln(Cash-








based Pay) t+1 
Cash to total 
compensation 
Ratio t+1 
Attack Proximity 0.135*** 0.197** 0.179*** -0.109 -0.084 0.018 -0.080 0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.242) (0.316) (0.787) (0.342) (0.000)
Firm characteristics  
Firm size 0.119*** -0.324*** 0.070*** 0.089 -0.019 0.066 0.084 -0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.255) (0.759) (0.296) (0.211) (0.000)
Volatility 0.072 -1.581 -0.215 2.117*** -3.421*** -3.737*** 0.619 -0.009
 (0.758) (0.147) (0.363) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.372) (0.812)
RET[-12,0] 0.031** 0.366*** 0.080*** 0.072 0.070 0.121** 0.096* -0.013*** 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.279) (0.202) (0.031) (0.070) (0.000)
ROA 0.346*** -0.185 0.313*** -0.151 0.038 -0.102 -0.071 -0.023* 
 (0.001) (0.727) (0.004) (0.582) (0.907) (0.590) (0.789) (0.096)
M/B Ratio -0.002 -0.010 -0.001 0.044** -0.030** -0.003 0.037** -0.003*** 
 (0.565) (0.383) (0.780) (0.031) (0.024) (0.788) (0.027) (0.005)
Cash/Assets -0.141 -0.490* -0.220* -0.424 -0.526** -0.639*** -0.651** -0.015
 (0.310) (0.095) (0.070) (0.238) (0.044) (0.002) (0.022) (0.308)
Leverage -0.025 -0.291** -0.081** -0.605*** -0.020 -0.069 -0.493*** 0.014** 
 (0.499) (0.029) (0.029) (0.000) (0.877) (0.512) (0.001) (0.026)
Capex/Assets 0.120 -2.307* -0.171 1.745* -1.751*** -1.719*** 0.473 -0.015
 (0.537) (0.086) (0.460) (0.087) (0.009) (0.007) (0.462) (0.596)
CEO characteristics  
CEO Age 0.000 0.010* 0.001 -0.012** -0.004 0.004 -0.008* 0.000
 (0.952) (0.063) (0.516) (0.043) (0.318) (0.236) (0.071) (0.981)
CEO Ownership -0.008** -0.018** -0.008*** -0.043*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.044*** 0.000
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.236)
Lagged Pay  




Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and 
year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 22,561 22,561 22,561 22,561 22,561 22,561 22,561 20,230
Adj. R2 0.521 0.557 0.583 0.651 0.350 0.388 0.720 0.465
 
 
Table 7. Do company policies change in response to terrorist attacks? 
 
This table presents difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of the proximity of a terrorist attack on the level of firm policy variables 
in the year after the attack (Panel A) and at different quarters surrounding the attack (Panel B). The variable Cash is defined as Cash items scaled 
by total assets (CHEQ/ATQ); Leverage is defined as the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by total assets ((DLCQ+DLTTQ)/ATQ); 
NWC is defined as Net working capital (Inventories + receivables - payables scaled by total revenues) ((INVTQ+RECTQ-APQ)/REVTQ); R&D is 
defined as R&D expenses over total assets (XRDQ/ATQ); Investment is defined as Total cash flow from investing activities (capital expenditures + 
acquisition expenditures) scaled by net property, plant, and equipment ((CAPXQ+AQCY)/PPENTQ); AP is defined as Payables scaled by total 
revenues (APQ/REVTQ); Receivables is defined as Receivables scaled by total revenues (RECTQ/REVTQ). q+i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the county of the firm headquarters at quarter q+i is in the area affected by an attack during quarter q0. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
B. P-values clustered by firm and year-quarter are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Impact of attack proximity on firm policy variables following the attack 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Casht+1 Leveraget+1 NWCt+1 R&Dt+1 Investmentt+1 APt+1 Receivablest+1
Attack Proximity -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.024* -0.029*
 (0.127) (0.664) (0.871) (0.885) (0.867) (0.070) (0.065)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 68,576 64,675 64,006 68,576 66,049 64,006 64,006




Panel B: Impact of attack proximity on firm policy variables over time 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Casht+1 Leveraget+1 NWCt+1 R&Dt+1 Investmentt+1 APt+1 Receivablest+1
q-4 0.001 -0.004** -0.004 -0.000 -0.007 0.004 0.003
 (0.714) (0.025) (0.850) (0.661) (0.655) (0.679) (0.798)
q-3 0.003 -0.004 -0.019 -0.000 -0.010 -0.003 -0.011
 (0.189) (0.218) (0.305) (0.199) (0.586) (0.747) (0.176)
q-2 0.003 -0.004 -0.023 -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.022**
 (0.260) (0.197) (0.102) (0.452) (0.886) (0.465) (0.014)
q-1 0.001 -0.006** -0.031** 0.000 -0.012 -0.005 -0.012
 (0.709) (0.032) (0.049) (0.857) (0.520) (0.644) (0.277)
q0 0.002 -0.006** -0.028* -0.000 -0.013 -0.017 -0.031**
 (0.612) (0.047) (0.098) (0.428) (0.476) (0.293) (0.028)
q+1 0.001 -0.005 -0.031 -0.001* -0.023 -0.029 -0.043**
 (0.644) (0.157) (0.108) (0.087) (0.151) (0.130) (0.016)
q+2 -0.001 -0.007* -0.013 -0.000 -0.012 -0.017 -0.038**
 (0.861) (0.065) (0.489) (0.652) (0.416) (0.277) (0.025)
q+3 -0.003 -0.007 0.005 -0.000 0.004 -0.037* -0.032*
 (0.418) (0.111) (0.770) (0.904) (0.828) (0.052) (0.100)
q+4 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.000 0.007 -0.026 -0.042**
 (0.482) (0.417) (0.606) (0.842) (0.687) (0.202) (0.029)
q+5 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.035* -0.039*
 (0.141) (0.843) (0.963) (0.466) (0.966) (0.069) (0.073)
q+6 -0.006* -0.002 -0.013 0.000 0.004 -0.020 -0.030
 (0.088) (0.611) (0.544) (0.744) (0.863) (0.216) (0.171)
q+7 -0.007* -0.000 -0.017 0.000 0.010 -0.027* -0.035
 (0.082) (0.912) (0.382) (0.374) (0.677) (0.084) (0.149)
q+8 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.000 0.005 -0.022 -0.020
 (0.222) (0.855) (0.832) (0.416) (0.760) (0.145) (0.405)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm and year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 68,576 64,675 64,006 68,576 66,049 64,006 64,006




Table 8. Effects on shareholders 
 
This table reports post-attack long term cumulative abnormal returns of the firms affected by the terrorist 
attack. Affected firms are defined as in Table 2. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined as the 
stock returns of the treatment firm minus that of its control firm. We use the PSM method for one-to-one 
matching as in Table 3 to obtain 769 matched pairs (some events may affect more than one firm). *, **, 
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 CARs




6 months -0.040** -0.022* 0.015 0.057 
8 months -0.062*** -0.021** 0.003 0.014 
10 months -0.078*** -0.022** 0.002 0.016 





Table 9. Does CEO bargaining power influence the effect of terrorist attacks on pay? 
 
This table presents coefficients from difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions where attack proximity is 
defined as in Table 2. All variables are defined in Appendix B. P-values clustered by firm and year are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Ln(Total Pay) t+1  
 (1) (2) (3)
Attack Proximity 0.063*** 0.096*** 0.072**
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.035)
Pay Gap 0.022***  
 (0.000)  
Attack Proximity × Pay Gap 0.041**  
 (0.038)  
Excess Turnover 0.450*  
 (0.061)  
Attack Proximity × Excess Turnover -0.620**  
 (0.029)  
CEO Tenure 0.003*
 (0.076)
Attack Proximity × CEO Tenure 0.007*
 (0.085)
Firm characteristics  
Firm size 0.236*** 0.241*** 0.244***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.078 0.039 0.080
 (0.757) (0.895) (0.771)
RET[-12,0] 0.131*** 0.147*** 0.149***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.380*** 0.420*** 0.456***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M/B Ratio 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.021***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash/Assets -0.002 -0.045 -0.022
 (0.982) (0.556) (0.762)
Leverage -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.232***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capex/Assets 0.279 0.218 0.299
 (0.149) (0.298) (0.159)
CEO characteristics  
CEO Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
 (0.440) (0.694) (0.118)
CEO Ownership -0.003* -0.005** -0.006**
 (0.087) (0.041) (0.014)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes Yes
Obs 22,390 20,151 21,953
Adj. R2 0.718 0.727 0.718
 
 
Table 10. Effects on other executives and employees 
 
This table presents coefficients from difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions measuring the effect of 
attack on the compensation of other executives and rank-and-file employees. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B and attack proximity is defined as in Table 2. P-values clustered by firm and year are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 





Executive Pay) t+1 
Ln(Employee  
Pay) t+1
Attack Proximity -0.033**  0.008
 (0.011)  (0.608)
Δ Ln(Total CEO Pay)t+1 0.197*** 
 (0.000)
Attack Proximity ×Δ Ln(Total CEO Pay)t+1 -0.037*
 (0.054)
Firm characteristics   
Firm size 0.307*** 0.330*** 0.118***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Volatility 0.416* 0.427 0.342
 (0.087) (0.102) (0.136)
RET[-12,0] 0.130*** 0.116*** -0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.961)
ROA 0.339*** 0.323*** -0.121
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.246)
M/B Ratio 0.031*** 0.035*** -0.001
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.718)
Cash/Assets -0.060 -0.056 -0.024
 (0.311) (0.383) (0.790)
Leverage -0.226*** -0.242*** 0.028
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.483)
Capex/Assets 0.559*** 0.625*** 0.059
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.750)
CEO and other executive characteristics  
Other Executive Aget -0.002* -0.002
 (0.060) (0.123)
Other Executive Ownershipt 0.001 -0.002
 (0.711) (0.588)
CEO Age  -0.001
  (0.266)
CEO Ownership  0.001
  (0.574)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and year Yes Yes Yes
Obs 21,822 19,624 3,510
Adj. R2 0.783 0.807 0.924
 
